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3
SOME INTRODUCTORY THOUGHTS 
ABOUT STATISTICAL METHODS  
Confronting facts and analysing statistics 
form an important element of economic 
examination. It is particularly interesting 
and instructive to look at data from a 
longer period. For they show whether 
earlier assumptions and conclusions have 
proved correct. 
However, clear thinking and analysis 
of statistical processes are complicated by 
at least three factors. One is the com-
plex interdependence of economic proc-
esses. There are many causative factors 
at work concurrently, whose relations 
vary in strength. The causes are at once 
effects, the contributing factors also con-
sequences. Only vulgarization of econom-
ics can reduce these processes to a small 
number of connections, often assumed to 
be unidirectional (a few dependent and 
independent variables). 
A second significant factor is that 
economics is not a value-free pursuit. 
Schools of economics are imbued with 
interests and viewpoints that may colour 
the same statistical facts in different 
ways. 
Finally, every statistical presentation 
raises the question of data quality. 
Though many steps have been taken in-
ternationally to harmonize data compila-
tion, problems of differing measurement 
methods and so differing data are often 
found, even among developed countries. 
Such distortions must certainly be ex-
pected with statistics summarizing the 
processes of the world economy. The two 
decades of GDP figures cited in this 
study have been revised significantly by 
UNCTAD in the last two years, by several 
tenths of a percentage point. Further-
more, the organizations providing the 
statistics are each influenced strongly by 
considerations of their own. An obvious, 
well-known example is the way the IMF 
figures for the long-term economic (GDP) 
growth of some groups of countries are 
far stronger (for methodological reasons) 
than those deriving from UNCTAD.1 
However, these limitations can be 
overridden to some extent. There are 
“minima” in economics against which 
facts can be evaluated, for instance, 
when the economic impacts of different 
country groups are compared. The situa-
tion is more difficult when growth fac-
tors are assessed. There are some schools 
of thought that attribute absolute signifi-
cance to correlation calculations and pay 
little heed in their models to real com-
plex relations of the variables considered 
dependent or independent, or to other 
effects not featuring in their models. For 
example, rapid export expansion is seen 
these days as a major factor behind 
economic prosperity, yet as we shall see 
in the actual processes, this is not so in 
every case: a boost to the foreign econ-
omy may be a consequence of domestic 
economic development (via higher pro-
ductivity and improved competitiveness, 
say). Which is really the cause and 
really the effect? As for the quality of 
statistics, it can be hoped that they will 
reflect, more rather than less, at least 
the direction of the main development 
tendencies, if the figures of a single data 
provider are being used – and if statisti-
cal methods converge in this globalizing 
world of ours. 
The proper approach in my view is to 
use statistics to illustrate the economic 
analysis and exploration of deeper proc-
esses, not the reverse, which I think 
provides fewer chances of unveiling the 
deeper, substantive relations. Nonetheless, 
I will try to analyse the tendencies in the 
figures and identify the main driving 
forces behind them. I will strive to reveal 
the main, decisive factors behind the 
medium-term tendencies in the world 
economy. This will be helped by looking 
back on earlier decades in the main ta-
                                                   
1 The IMF summarizes country-group data at 
purchasing-power parity, based on UN exchanges 
rates. 
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bles. Long-term comparative examination 
will also be assisted by investigating the 
background to the changes since the 
turn of the millennium.  
The original statistics used in this 
study were prepared in 2005; most data 
lines follow the main processes in the 
world economy up to 2003. For this 
publication, I have extended the main 
data lines further, which also provides 
an opportunity to refer briefly to more 
recent tendencies.  
LOW GDP AND PER CAPITA 
GDP GROWTH RATES IN THE AGE 
OF GLOBALIZATION 
The rate of growth in the world econ-
omy has declined in the globalization 
age, since the beginning of the 1970s. 
According to UNCTAD (see Table 2), the 
global GDP growth rate in the “golden 
age” of the 1960s was 5.3 per cent, 
which eased to 3.6 per cent in the 
1970s, 3.2 per cent in the 1980s, and 
2.8 per cent in the 1990s. The 2000s 
began with a a further decrease (an av-
erage increment of less than 2.5 per 
cent in the first three years) but then 
picked up to almost 4 per cent in 
2004–6, giving a six-year average of 3 
per cent.2 
The decade-by-decade slide in global 
growth rates is attributable mainly to the 
developed countries, with their great 
weight in the world economy. Their 
1960s average growth rate of 5.1 per 
cent was down to 1.5 per cent in the 
1990s and 2.0 per cent in the first five 
                                                   
2 According to UNCTAD, average annual global 
growth in 2000–2005 was 2.8 per cent (Hand-
book of Statistics 2006-07, 402). The same pub-
lication includes revised figures for the 1980s, 
with global GDP rising at an annual rate of only 
2.6 per cent, not the earlier 3.2 per cent esti-
mate shown in Table 2. This supports the con-
clusion that economic growth has been slower in 
the globalization age than previously.  
years of the new century.3 However, the 
growth path of the United States differed 
from those of the other two members of 
the triad. While the growth rates in 
Europe and Japan were falling steadily – 
in fact Japan entered a period of growth 
crisis in the 1990s – the United States 
continued to increase its income in the 
1980s and 1990s (an annual average of 
3.5 per cent). In the first three years of 
the new century, the United States’ 
growth average was 2.3 per cent, as 
opposed to Europe’s 1.3 per cent and 
Japan’s 0.8 per cent. The figures for the 
following three years, after the recession 
(2004–6) were 3.5, 2.6 and 2.3 per cent 
respectively.4 
As for the reasons for the decline in 
the growth rate, I would like to mention 
how the global, transnational stage of 
capitalism was precipitated by a fall in 
profits at the turn of the 1960s and 
1970s. The response to this was a 
change in capitalism’s mode of operation 
assisted by a revolution in information, 
communications and transport, for in-
stance, a new wave of capital concentra-
tion; the formation of transnational cor-
porations; liberalization and consequent 
transfer of production and obsolete tech-
nology in the centres to low-wage coun-
tries; and the financial bubble as capital 
surplus to requirements in a recession 
was placed on world markets, which 
also contributed to indebtedness in most 
countries in the world. This produced a 
new situation: 
1) The new technical revolution increased 
                                                   
3 This is also a slow growth rate compared with 
earlier periods of modern capitalism. According 
to the IMF, the average annual GDP growth rate 
for 16 developed countries over 1881–1913 was 
2.8 per cent. Between the wars (1919–38) it av-
eraged 3.8 per cent, despite the Great Depres-
sion. In the Bretton-Woods period (1950–72), it 
was 5.3 per cent, between 1973 and 2000, 2.6 
per cent, and in 2000–2006 (all the developed 
countries) 2.3 per cent. (WEO, April 2002, 108; 
April 2007, 211). 
4 The last three figures come from the IMF, i. e. 
a couple of tenths higher than those of UNCTAD, 
which still has not published figures for 2006.  
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markedly the technical content of pro-
duction at the expense of live labour. 
This reduced the growth rate in the 
contribution of labour to globally 
produced added value.  
2) This new situation also curbed the 
growth rate in global ultimate market 
demand. (a) The fall in the proportion 
of live work (i.e. the increase in un-
employment and the decrease in the 
rate of employment among the popu-
lation of active age) self-evidently 
curbed solvent demand as well. In-
deed, in a way unprecedented at a 
time of business expansion, the abso-
lute number of employed began to 
decline in the developed countries in 
the second half of the 1990s. (b) One 
contributing factor was the migration 
of workplaces to very low-wage areas 
on the semi-peripheries. This further 
reduced the wage element in produc-
tion costs, which placed a further 
constraint on demand. (c) Cuts in la-
bour input and related social-
contribution costs are demanded by 
the struggle for profitability and com-
petitiveness caused by heightened 
worldwide economic competition. Real 
wages and social costs have been cut 
in many places as a way of making 
the labour market “flexible”. This 
process is also encouraged under 
conditions of globalization by increas-
ingly direct competition between em-
ployees of developed and of less de-
veloped countries. 
3) The present stage of capitalism differs 
from previous ones in that the yield 
on financial investments has become 
higher, much higher, than that of in-
vestments of operating capital. This 
has made it more difficult to finance 
production and service activities. 
4) The global demand for products in 
the developing countries has also been 
curbed by the costs of debt servicing, 
and by the dramatic deterioration in 
their terms of foreign trade by the 
beginning of the 1990s. 
Reductions in rates of GDP growth 
are typical of developing countries as 
well, especially if the remarkable indices 
of China are excluded from the calcula-
tion. However, the growth-rate reduction 
in the developing countries is much less 
spectacular than for the developed coun-
tries (5.9 per cent in the 1960s, 4.9 per 
cent in the 1990s). In fact growth in 
Africa, West Asia and Latin America 
proved faster in the 1990s than in the 
debt-ridden 1980s, although it was still 
only about half that of the 1960s. The 
growth rate declined in most countries 
of East and South Asia, but it was still 
in the region of 6 per cent in the 1990s. 
There was a big fall in 2001, but the 
growth of the 1900s was generally re-
sumed in the early years of the new 
century. (In Latin America, it only began 
to grow again in 2004.) 
The 1980s, followed by the transition 
to capitalism and entry into the world 
market, threw Central and Eastern 
Europe into a serious growth crisis. GDP 
in the region had been growing by an 
average of 5.4 per cent in the 1970s, 
but it faltered and fell slightly in the 
1980s, and then fell by an average of 
1.7 per cent per annum in the 1990s, 
despite the resumption of growth in the 
second half of the decade. It meant that 
the region’s GDP in 2000 was 20 per 
cent lower than it had been a decade 
earlier. Within this, GDP in the CIS 
countries and the Balkans fell by an av-
erage of 4.5 per cent (to half), while 
that of the Central European post-
communist countries recovered its previ-
ous level. There has been a relatively 
high average growth of 5.6 per cent a 
year in the 21st century, but this can be 
explained partly by the rise in oil prices, 
and recovery from the very low levels to 
which Russian and Ukrainian GDP had 
fallen. 
The global cycles are decided above 
all by the United States economy, with 
the other regions following a year or 
two later. For instance, the European Un-
ion in the early 1990s reached the low 
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point in its recession two years after the 
United States had done and kept the 
same distance during its recovery. The 
relatively long period of upswing (lasting 
almost ten years in the United States, 
creating an illusion of a “new economy” 
immune to slump) was followed in 2001 
by a decline in every region, including 
Europe. But Europe failed to follow the 
subsequent North American recovery un-
til 2006, the customary two or three 
years later. While the US growth rate in 
the second half of 2003 was above 3 
per cent per annum, that of the EU was 
only 1.5 per cent in 2005. 
The developing continents increased 
their rates of growth in the 1990s over 
the 1980s (from 3.9 to 4.9 per cent), 
obvious factors being sizeable amounts of 
foreign direct investment, transfers of 
production and stabilization of raw-
material prices. Despite the financial cri-
ses and recession of 1997–8, the devel-
oping world was buoyant. Though Africa 
only managed an annual average GDP 
growth rate of 2.4 per cent over the 
decade, Latin America’s was 3.2 per cent 
and Asia’s 6.2 per cent. Asia kept that 
pace in the first half of this decade and 
Africa 4.7 per cent (due mainly to in-
creases in raw-material prices), but Latin 
America only 2.4 per cent. 
The statistical average for GDP per 
capita is determined not only by produc-
tion value, but by the growth in the 
population. The rate of global population 
increase was 0.3 percentage points lower 
in the 1990s than in the 1980s, to an 
average of 1.4 per cent, then 1.2 per 
cent in the 2000s. Within that, the an-
nual rate of increase in the developing 
countries (80 per cent of the world’s 
population) eased from 2.1 to 1.7 per 
cent in the 1990s, and to 1.5 per cent 
in the 2000s. This was encouraging in 
the light of ecological crisis, shortages of 
fresh water, and outbreaks of famine in 
some regions. But it must be added em-
phatically that the environmental crisis 
and the global supply of clean water 
could be solved with present technology5 
and absolute famine avoided, for the lat-
ter causes 140,000 deaths a day, 
100,000 of them among children. But to 
do so would mean overriding present 
social interest relations, taking measures 
to ensure economic growth in the most 
backward regions, and increasing agri-
cultural production. This would be a 
major change, because the developed 
countries – champions of liberalism and 
open markets – would have to apply 
their principles where it was detrimental 
to them to do so. Much more could be 
done for the needy Third World by dis-
mantling agricultural subsidies and trans-
ferring them to social and regional funds 
than the present official aid expenditure 
does.6 
Nonetheless, population pressure still 
weighs on the social and ecological prob-
lems of most developing countries, espe-
cially sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle 
East, where the rate of natural increase 
is over 2 per cent per annum – as op-
posed to 3 per cent two decades ago, 
although the toll of AIDS contributed to 
the decrease. 
Meanwhile the developed countries 
exhibit low rates of natural increase and 
relative ageing of the population. This 
will cause crises in the health-care and 
pension systems and social cuts, due to 
socioeconomic processes partly discussed 
already. 
One social projection of the grave 
transformation crisis in Central and East-
ern Europe has been a fall of six years 
in life expectancy at birth and an abso-
lute decline in population. 
Despite the fall in the global repro-
                                                   
5 According to UN data, a 1 per cent wealth tax 
on the world’s 200 richest people could give the 
whole world population clean water supplies in a 
few years.  
6 Developing countries feel the competition from 
heavily subsidized agricultural production harder 
than Hungary does, as they lie outside the cus-
toms union and cannot afford to subsidize their 
agriculture at all. 
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duction rate, the rate of increase in per 
capita GDP has slowed (see Table 2). 
This can be ascribed to falling rates of 
increase in global and regional gross 
output. In the 1960s, per capita GDP 
was rising in the developed countries by 
4 per cent a year, the developing coun-
tries by 3.2 per cent, and the then 
European socialist countries by 5.6 per 
cent. The increases fell in the 1990s 1.9, 
3.1 and -1.5 per cent (including the CIS 
and Balkan countries at -4.2 per cent) 
respectively. The average annual growth 
rate of per capita GDP in the developed 
countries eased in the first five years of 
this century, to 1.4 per cent. Meanwhile 
the aggregate rate for the developing 
regions as a whole increased to 3.7 per 
cent. This average was raised by the 
contributions of China, India and some 
of the East Asian countries, but lowered 
by those of Africa and Latin America, 
whose combined income per capita fell 
in the 1980s. This was followed by es-
sential stagnation in Africa in the 1990s 
and very low growth in Latin America 
(1.5 per cent per annum). Poverty, how-
ever, continued to increase on both con-
tinents as differentiation in the income 
structure continued. Meanwhile the 1986 
fall in the oil price contributed to a 
sizeable fall in per capita GDP in the 
Middle East in the 1990s. In the first 
five years of the 2000s, only Asia man-
aged a high rate of increase in per cap-
ita GPD (5 per cent per annum). In Af-
rica and Latin America the increase was 
small (2.3 and 1.1 per cent respectively). 
The falling population in East-Central 
Europe and the CIS countries coupled 
with rising GDP produced a sharp in-
crease in per capita income, of 5–6 per 
cent a year. 
Another UN report has 1.5 billion of 
the Earth’s 6 billion inhabitants living in 
countries and regions reporting a fall in 
per capita income over the last two dec-
ades (mainly in Africa, West Asia, and 
developing countries), while GDP per 
capita per day for a further 2 billion 
rose by less than USD 0.33 (WESS 2001, 
243). The per capita income gulf be-
tween developed and developing coun-
tries widened rapidly, from 19-fold at 
the beginning of the globalization period 
to 25-fold after the millennium. However, 
if East Asia is included in the average, it 
has narrowed from 16-fold to 10-fold 
(Ibid.) 
 THE SOURCES OF GDP 
The previous decades’ structural shifts in 
the sources and expenditure of GDP 
continued in the 1990s. The role of agri-
culture in GDP was further reduced and 
marginalized. The weight of industrial 
activity fell in several regions, while that 
of services rose by several percentage 
points (Table 3). 
By the millennium, agriculture was 
accounting for less than 2 per cent of 
GDP in the developed countries. In the 
developing world, its weight fell from 15 
per cent at the beginning of the 1990s 
to 11 per cent in 2005. The fall was 
from 27 to 13 per cent in China, 31 t0 
25 per cent in India, 18 to 10 per cent 
in the whole of Asia, and to 7 per cent 
in Latin America. But in Africa, bypassed 
by the structural transformation associ-
able with economic development, the 
weight of agriculture remained roughly 
stable at 17 per cent up to the turn of 
the century. Meanwhile it fell from 15 t0 
7 per cent in the transition countries of 
Central and Eastern Europe, which also 
reflected an agricultural crisis in the re-
gion. In Hungary’s case, the fall was 
from 15 to 4 per cent, due to falls in 
agricultural volume and value and to the 
cessation of industrial activity by agricul-
tural cooperatives, which had partly been 
registered as agricultural. 
The fall in the statistical weight of in-
dustry in the developed world appears 
as significant – from 32 to 25 per cent 
over the 15 years. Within this, there was 
 
 
8 
a slower loss of share for manufactur-
ing, from 21 to 16 per cent.7 The statis-
tically discernible weight of industry in 
the production of GDP declined by 7.5–8 
percentage points in the United States, 
the EU and Japan, with the declines in 
manufacturing 1–2 percentage points less 
than that. 
However, the average weight of indus-
trial activity in developing countries was 
rising slightly, from 36 per cent in 1990 
to 38 in 2005, with manufacturing in-
creasing within that from 22 to 23.5 per 
cent. The increasing differentiation in the 
developing world appears again here, 
with figures ranging widely: 38 to 37 
per cent in Africa, 33 to 32 in Latin 
America, 45 to 35 in the transition 
countries of SE Europe and the CIS, but 
37 to 40 per cent in Asia (41 t0 46 in 
China) for industry as a whole and 23 
t0 27 per cent in manufacturing (36 to 
40 in China). 
Remarkably, the decline in the share 
of industry in GDP, notably that of 
manufacturing, was strongest in the 
transition countries of SE Europe8 and in 
the CIS (from 45 t0 37 and 35 t0 19 
per cent, respectively). More precisely, 
the share of industry stabilized at its 
1995 level, though the decline in manu-
facturing speeded up after 2000 (the 
figure was still 27 per cent in 2000). 
Most manufacturing in the region col-
lapsed, partly because of market opening 
and consequent pressure from world 
markets. Meanwhile extraction work and 
some construction activities came to the 
fore, so that the weight of the raw-
materials sector within industry in-
creased. The industrial structure de-
graded to something similar to that of 
                                                   
7 The 2004 statistics of UNCTAD still contained 
different data, showing the share of manufactur-
ing falling by only 1–2 percentage points. Revised 
figures appeared in the 2006–7 yearbook, but 
these also show the reduction in the weight of 
manufacturing speeding up on leading markets 
only after the millennium (2000: 18.2 per cent). 
8 The eight transition countries that joined the EU 
in 2004 are not grouped here by UNCTAD. 
countries at a medium rate of develop-
ment. 
The changes in the share of industry 
in GDP reflect interesting and diverse 
processes. Its loss of weight in the devel-
oped countries can be ascribed partly to 
the increase in the role of services (ac-
tually less important than the statistics 
suggest, a point returned to later) and 
partly to the transfer of industrial activi-
ties to more backward regions that are 
still industrializing. But the figures also 
reflect that industries involving raw ma-
terials and primary processing transfer 
to cheap-labour countries first, whereas 
those at the peaks of industry tend, ac-
cording to expert analyses, to remain in 
the developed world, so that the statisti-
cal weight of manufacturing in the de-
veloped countries falls rather less. The 
figures also show that the industrializa-
tion largely concerns the single region of 
East Asia, above all China. South Korea, 
for instance, has arrived at the “post-
industrial” stage of development, with a 
declining weight for industry. The less 
developed countries actually display a 
declining role for industry too – the ef-
fects of opening to heightened competi-
tion on world markets have included one 
of deindustrialization. So everywhere ex-
cept in Asia, there has been a slow 
deindustrializing of the peripheries, which 
has meant not a process of moderniza-
tion similar to that of the developed 
countries, but heightened competition 
from the industrial products of a global-
ized world market and an associated 
decline in competitiveness. 
Nevertheless, the fall in the weight of 
industry may be only statistical and not 
reflect reality, at least in developed 
countries. Statistical methods have failed 
to keep pace with the “industrialization” 
of services. Preparation of industrial 
software, for instance, is recorded under 
services, despite being an engineering 
activity attached to modern industry. 
Many activities that used to increase the 
added value of industry are now “out-
sourced” under service contracts, and so 
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come under services. Services themselves 
may have become “industrialized”, as 
there is a process of concentration in 
this field as well. Service activities now 
include final assembly, packaging and 
logistic aspects previously recorded under 
industry. 
Nor can these aspects be ignored 
when the proportions in developed and 
developing countries are compared. If 
the proportions of industry in various 
regions are compared mechanically, irre-
spective of development levels and re-
gional features of services, one can ar-
rive at absurd statements, for instance 
that Latin America is structurally more 
industrialized than the United States. For 
the proportion of manufacturing in the 
generation of GDP is higher there than 
in the United States, let alone that of 
industrial activity as a whole! This shows 
how sizes, weights and tendencies ap-
pearing in statistics need substantive 
analysis. Statistics do not always show 
underlying processes or may in some 
respects conceal or distort them. 
All this must be considered when in-
terpreting how the weight of services on 
the income side of GDP in the developed 
regions has grown by 8 percentage 
points to 74 per cent in the last decade 
and a half. The increase was only 3 
percentage points in the developing coun-
tries, to 52 per cent in 2005. So in this 
respect the spread between the developed 
and the developing countries is not wide. 
But it has to be said (Table 3) that the 
greatest weight for services among major 
countries in the world economy is 79 
per cent of GDP in the United States 
and the lowest 41 per cent in China. 
Understandably, after the crises in indus-
try and agriculture and the major devel-
opment of the services, the services share 
among transition countries outside the 
EU after 2004 has leapt from 36 per 
cent to 55. 
Another side of services to consider 
here besides the industrialization of them 
mentioned already is their marketization 
in many countries in the last decade. 
Privatization of hitherto free, even subsi-
dized public services has been accompa-
nied by marked price hikes, which raise 
the statistical weight of services despite 
the absence of a real increase in per-
formance. 
Furthermore, the services form a spe-
cial element on the source side of GDP. 
For maintaining the apparatus of state, 
environmental protection, military expen-
ditures, etc. are in fact consumption. 
Yet, according to the GDP accounting 
method, they appear on the income side 
as well. 
THE STRUCTURE OF GDP 
CONSUMPTION 
Turning to the data for ultimate utiliza-
tion of GDP (Table 3), the first obvious 
fact is that despite liberal doctrine, gov-
ernmental consumption of GDP in the 
developed countries increased from 18 to 
19.6 per cent over the decade-and-a-half 
examined, while in the developing coun-
tries it stagnated at 13–14 per cent. This 
suggests there are strong constraints on 
reducing state expenditure and disman-
tling the apparatus of a modern state. 
But there are important regional differ-
ences as well. Government consumption 
of GDP in the United States eased from 
17 to 14 per cent in the 1990s, but 
stood at a remarkable 19 per cent in 
2005. Roles in that were played by the 
federal economy-boosting package and 
by the Iraqi War, both of which had 
stimulating effects on the economy. The 
GDP proportion of state spending in the 
EC 12 at the beginning of the 1990s was 
20 per cent; after some fluctuation, it 
stood at 20.6 per cent in 2005. The 
same figure for Japan rose from 13 per 
cent to 18, mainly because of govern-
ment investment and consumption-
boosting programmes to raise the econ-
omy out of recession. 
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The figures show it is just a myth 
that less developed countries spend more 
on the state apparatus than developed 
countries. Their states actually consumed 
13.9 per cent of GDP in 1990 and 13.3 
per cent in 2005 – 6 percentage points 
less than those of the developed coun-
tries. The countries of Africa and Latin 
America spend a slightly higher propor-
tion than the group average and those 
of Asia a slightly lower. Nor is the pro-
portion of GDP spent on running the 
state any higher in the European-Asian 
non-EU transition states examined: 20 
per cent in 2000 and 17 in 2005.9 
The next index on the consumption 
side of GDP, private consumption, is too 
complex. It covers not only personal 
consumption, but business and financial 
profits, the consumed proportion of in-
come, and social-insurance expenditures.  
The share of personal consumption in 
GDP rose from 59.7 per cent to 62.4 in 
the developed countries and fell from 60 
per cent to 56 in the developing world. 
In the transition countries it was a 
steady 53–4 per cent. 
It is worth noting that in line with 
generally high social consumption in the 
United States, the share of private con-
sumption rose further from 67 per cent 
in 1990 to a post-millennium 70 per 
cent. This belies the liberal theory that a 
high and growing proportion of con-
sumption automatically works against 
competitiveness. The role of private con-
sumption in the EU 12 stagnated (at 57–
8 per cent) and in Japan it increased 
from 53 per cent to 57, but without 
bringing economic recovery (at least not 
until 2004). 
The private consumption proportion in 
Africa was 64 per cent in 1990 and 61 
per cent in 2005. In Asia it also fell, 
from 57 per cent to 53 (and in the 
Arab West-Asia region to 49). Here 
                                                   
9 Hungary spends a conspicuously high propor-
tion of GDP on the state: 24 per cent in 2005, 
similar to that of the welfare states of northern 
Europe.  
China marks the opposite extreme to the 
United States (a fall from 50 per cent to 
43), due largely to high savings and in-
vestment rates. Private consumption in 
Latin America rose from 63 per cent to 
65 in 2000, but down to 62.5 per cent 
again in 2005. 
The third element of GDP consumption 
is the investment rate, which is interest-
ing primarily as an expression of the 
value or proportion set aside for future 
economic growth. In this period there is 
a strong correlation between investment 
and growth rate, although this is not 
always linear and varies from country to 
country. The investment tendencies are 
not encouraging in most cases. 
GDP growth rates and investment 
rates in the developed countries have 
been falling for decades. (Causes have 
already been discussed.) The weakening 
of the propensity to set aside for the 
future continued in the early 2000s. The 
gross investment/GDP ratio changed be-
tween 1990 and 2005 from 23 per cent 
to 19.4 in the industrial countries (18 
per cent to 16.5 in the United States, 23 
per cent to 20 in Europe, and a re-
markable 33 per cent to 23 in Japan.)  
The investment proportion in the de-
veloping world was 25 per cent at the 
beginning of the 1990s, 28 in mid-
decade (thanks to the boom in Asia), 
24–5 per cent after the turn of the cen-
tury, and 26 in 2005. The long-term 
development rate on each continent ap-
pears in investment proportions of 19 
per cent in Africa, 29 in Asia, and 21 
in Latin America. In China, with 10 per 
cent annual economic growth, a propor-
tion of 42 per cent was recorded in 
2005. In Central and Eastern Europe 
and the CIS countries the index eased 
from 29 per cent to 22 over the dec-
ade-and-a-half. 
If the three elements of GDP con-
sumption discussed so far (state and pri-
vate consumption, and investment), it be-
comes clear there is a net, perverse re-
grouping of income at work, from the 
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developing (and transition) countries to 
the developed.10 According to data for 
the turn of the century, the figure for 
final consumption by the latter was 0.7 
per cent higher than their GDP, and in 
2005 it was 1.5 per cent higher, while 
that of the developing world was 3, then 
4 per cent lower. Behind this likes his-
torically unprecedented excess consump-
tion by the United States: in 1990, 1 per 
cent, in 2000, 3–4 per cent, and in 
2005, 5.5 per cent more was consumed, 
and the proportion went higher still in 
2006. Using this calculation in 2005, 5 
per cent of Africa’s and of Asia’s in-
come, 2 per cent of Latin America’s, 
and 6.5 per cent of the transition coun-
tries’ had been sucked into the developed 
world, primarily North America. In 
2004–5, the United States was the only 
net importer of capital apart from Cen-
tral and Eastern Europe, so that the 
whole world was funding the world’s 
mightiest economy. 
Finally, let us look at the ratio of 
goods and services exports to imports 
within GDP (Table 3). The ratio between 
them, expressed in percentage points, 
self-evidently reflects the deficits and 
surpluses just mentioned. So the imports 
measured in US GDP in 2005 were 5.6 
percentage points higher than the exports 
(16.6 per cent against 11). Meanwhile the 
developing world displayed a GDP share 
for exports 4.2 percentage points higher 
than for imports (in Africa and in Asia 
5 – including China 2.5 – Latin America 
2.5, and the transition countries 6.5). 
The contribution of foreign trade to 
GDP produced has increased everywhere 
in the last decade. On the export side, 
the annual average GDP contribution for 
the developed countries has risen from 
18 per cent to 24 (in the United States 
from 10 to 11, in the EU from 27 to a 
remarkable 38, and in Japan from 11 to 
14). The rise in the average for the de-
veloping countries has been from 25 per 
                                                   
10 This statement is refined in the final section of 
the paper. 
cent to a remarkable 41, for Asia from 
29 to 48, for China from 3 to 33, for 
Latin America from 17 to 26, and for 
the transition countries of Europe and 
Central Asia from 24 to 39. The clear 
exceptions are the low export propor-
tions in the United States and Japan. This 
is interesting as the United States had its 
longest and steepest boom since World 
War II in the 1990s, while Japan un-
derwent its worst slump. This is ex-
plained in the US case by two linked 
processes: the drawing in of external 
resources and rapid consequent expan-
sion of the home market. 
The figures also confirm that foreign 
trade plays a relatively small part in 
large countries with large populations 
and developed economies. 
THE MAIN FACTORS BEHIND    
ECONOMIC GROWTH 
Mainstream economic doctrine states that 
the great boost behind the economic 
growth of our time is expansion of the 
international division of labour. This is 
certainly a strong correlation: foreign 
trade in the developed countries has 
grown twice as fast since the beginning 
of the 1990s as GDP has (Tables 4 and 
4a). A strong correlation between export 
performance and economic growth also 
appears in the developing countries, but 
it is not a mechanically obvious one. 
Taking the slow growers, Africa in the 
1990s was raising its exports by only 3 
per cent a year, the Middle East by 5, 
but Latin America by 10 per cent, and 
the transition countries by 7 despite de-
clining GDP. In very fast-growing Asia, 
export growth averaged 14 per cent – 
2.2 times faster than GDP (WEO, April 
2007, 243–50). 
So despite the correlation, caution is 
required in linking growth rate with ex-
port performance. There are no clear 
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correlative relations. Each such assump-
tion is too mechanical and ignores the 
effects of other variables, the specifics of 
each country, and the place it occupies 
in the hierarchy of the international divi-
sion of labour. On the one hand, it usu-
ally generates 10–45 per cent of GDP, 
while private consumption, for instance, 
accounts for two-thirds. So the “trans-
mission” between export growth and 
GDP growth is weaker than with private 
consumption. Another reason for caution 
is that different correlations between the 
dependent and independent variables ap-
ply in different countries. To stay with 
foreign trade, the exports of Japan in 
the 14 years between 1990 and 2003, 
for instance, grew 2.9 times faster than 
GDP, while those of the much faster-
growing United States rose only 1.9 times 
(see the flexibility data of Table 4a). The 
exports dynamics of the EU exceeded 
those of the United States, but its eco-
nomic growth was markedly lower. Av-
erage export growth in the most dy-
namically developing Asian NICs was 
only 1.7 times their economic growth.11 
Similar caution will be shown here in 
examining the other economic processes 
and factors customarily associated with 
GDP growth. 
One is private consumption, just men-
tioned. It has been pointed out that this 
is an aggregate index ranging from 
wages and other personal incomes to 
profits devoted to consumption and sav-
ings. The advertised economic policies of 
governments speak in principle of con-
tinual efforts to curb consumption in 
favour of investment purposes, but the 
figures show private consumption in the 
developed world rising at a rate similar 
to that of GDP (the NICs, Japan) or 
faster (the EU, the United States). But the 
increase in personal pay in the most de-
veloped countries has been lower than 
the long-term GDP increase. (The NICs 
                                                   
11 Trends in world trade and their effect on eco-
nomic growth are discussed further in the next 
section. 
were an exception to this in the 1990s.) 
It can also be seen that the growth in 
pensions and other benefits is falling 
short of the rate of economic growth. 
Thus the proportion of income not de-
rived from capital has fallen and the 
proportion of non-governmental con-
sumption derived from capital has in-
creased.12 The facts for the 1990s belie 
the liberal doctrine that a rise in the 
proportion of capital income within all 
social income automatically serves to in-
crease investment. While the proportion 
of personal consumption has increased 
(except in the United States), the growth 
rate of gross accumulation has lagged 
far behind that of GDP (see the flexibil-
ity coefficients in Table 4a). The inade-
quate rate of technological investment is 
obviously one of the main reasons for 
the slow economic development of 
Europe and Japan. In the NICs, though, 
partly under pressure from world eco-
nomic processes, investment stagnated 
after 1997–8 and began to fall slightly, 
causing a slight fall in the growth rate 
beginning in the new century. As for the 
United States, rapid expansion of the ac-
cumulation process (rising private con-
sumption) was clearly enabled by em-
ploying external resources. 
The low investment rates coincided 
with relatively rapid growth in productiv-
ity. According to available data on 
manufacturing, it increased between 
1990 and 2003 by an annual average of 
3.5 per cent in the United Staes, 2.9 in 
the EU, 1.8 in Japan, and 6.3 in the 
NICs (Table 4). So in the longer term, 
there is no big difference between the 
European and US productivity improve-
ments. What is dangerous for Europe is 
that the difference began to increase 
perceptibly at the end of the 1990s. 
However, the situation began to improve 
again in 2004, and Europe showed a 
                                                   
12 This appears from labour-market figures in 
the IMF World Economic Outlook. See also the 
US and Irish case studies in Artner 2006, 182–4 
and 197–210.  
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rapid 4 per cent productivity increase in 
2006. 
Experience shows productivity to be 
the most important factor in economic 
growth. Rising productivity is a signifi-
cant determinant of the growth and 
structure of investment. Interestingly, the 
rate of productivity growth in the United 
States lags behind that of investment, de-
spite marked technical development, but 
in the rest of the developed world it ex-
ceeds it (by 1.2–1.3 percentage points). A 
rise in productivity, incidentally, goes 
with a fall in demand for live labour. 
Finally, let us look at the money sup-
ply (M2) 13 available for economic devel-
opment. This indicator reflects how strict 
monetary policy has been or how liquid-
ity-increasing in a Keynesian sense. 
If the growth data for the volume of 
money in circulation (M2, Table 4) are 
corrected by the consumer price index, 
the money supply in the United States is 
seen to have lagged 0.8 per cent behind 
GDP in 1990–2003, while the former 
exceeded the latter by 1 per cent in the 
EU, 0.2 in Japan and 4 in the NICs (see 
also the flexibility indices in Table 4a). 
So US monetary policy has been truly 
conservative.14 Monetary policy in Euro-
pean countries and Japan was relatively 
cautious, mildly on the offensive, but the 
NICs (as in so many other respects) fol-
lowed a different model, combating infla-
tion less and increasing liquidity, using 
an incentive (Keynesian) economic-policy 
model. However, the NICs were obliged 
to change step in this and other respects 
about the time of the millennium. The 
1998 crisis was followed by deflationary 
pressure caused by short demand and 
market opening, so that price levels rose 
by an annual average of 1–2 per cent 
instead of 4–5 per cent. Concurrently, 
the previous annual liquidity increment 
of about 15 per cent was cut by a 
                                                   
13 Cash plus primary money-substituting securities 
and deposits. 
14 So to combat inflation, the money supply can 
grow at most at a rate similar to GDP growth. 
third. The NICs have been under increas-
ing pressure to conform to the “main-
stream” economic model, with associated 
constraints on economic growth. 
But in times of crisis, even the United 
States may turn back to the Keynesian 
model and pump money into its econ-
omy, for instance in 2001 and 2002, 
when liquidity grew by a gross 10 and 
7 per cent respectively. So too may the 
EU: M2 rose by 11 per cent in 2001, 
then by 6.5–7, and almost 10 in 2006. 
Japan, though, has not followed suit. 
Liberal economic policy (based on Ta-
bles 4 and 4a) can be discerned at most 
in the trends in public consumption, ex-
plainable by restrictions on public ser-
vices and welfare systems. As mentioned 
earlier in connection with utilization of 
GDP, states are tending to spend in-
creasingly on maintaining themselves. The 
increase in public spending in the United 
States and the NICs is much less than 
the rise in GDP, but little remains of the 
latter in Europe, which keeps up its wel-
fare system as best it can. In Japan, 
public spending over the 14 years exam-
ined grew one-and-a-half times faster 
than national income – GDP. The aim 
was to offset this by reducing invest-
ment. 
Summing up the statistics for the most 
recent years (2004–6, Table 4), it can 
be said that the United States, the EU, 
Japan and the NICs all began to experi-
ence faster group in GDP in 2004. Their 
exports grew particularly (by 7–8 per 
cent a year),15 with their gross accumu-
lation and productivity improvements re-
turning to the faster rates of the mid-
1990s (at least in the United States and 
Europe). There was also fast growth in 
the money supply (M2), except in Japan. 
These four factors (three in Japan) were 
the main stimuli to growth. The growth 
of private consumption in the United 
States continued to exceed that of GDP, 
while in Europe it was around 0.5 per-
                                                   
15 However, an important factor behind this was 
price increases. 
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centage points and in Japan about 1 
percentage point lower. Public consump-
tion rose more slowly in all three power 
centres. 
MORE ON THE TRADE/GROWTH 
CORRELATION  
Necessary consequences of the stronger 
international division of labour are tech-
nical development and market-driven 
capital concentration, i.e. the spread of 
transnational corporations. So for dec-
ades, the growth rate in the value of 
international trade has exceeded that of 
GDP. World goods exports (Table 6) 
rose by an annual 6 per cent in the 
1980s (at current prices, at relatively 
stable price levels) and 6.7 per cent in 
the 1990s, while aggregate GDP grew by 
3.2 per cent and 2.8 per cent respec-
tively. So the role of international trade 
in sustaining growth increased in the 
1990s, but slightly faster export expan-
sion did not automatically bring faster 
economic growth. 
Closer analysis raises further questions 
about the relation between trade and 
growth. Table 6 also shows five-year av-
erages, from which it turns out that the 
value (and volume) of world trade grew 
by only 3.7 per cent a year between 
1996 and 2000 and then stagnated in 
2001–2. So the export flexibility of GDP 
decreased markedly in the second half of 
the 1990s and deteriorated further in 
the 2000s. 
Based on the trend that developed in 
the second half of the 1990s, authors 
have enquired whether national trade has 
not had its day as a factor contributing 
to growth in the age of globalization. 
Could the transnationals’ strategy of re-
locating production have peaked, for the 
level of foreign direct investment actually 
fell at the turn of the century? Could 
globalization have had consequences for 
economic strategy, triggered reflexes, 
and aroused such social opposition that 
national governments began to use visible 
and less visible policy means to curb the 
processes of internationalization? Think 
of the United States’ albeit now with-
drawn extra import duties on steel prod-
ucts, quantitative quotas on Chinese 
products, etc. Could governments have 
been more forceful with non-tariff 
curbs? Could this have contributed to 
the problems at the WTO trade-liberation 
negotiations? In other words, developing 
countries are resisting liberalization of 
trade in services, or more precisely, de-
manding in turn that developed countries 
dismantle their agricultural and light in-
dustrial protectionist regimes.  
No final answers can be given. Inter-
national trade stagnated in the first half 
of the 1980s, only to rise at unprece-
dented rates for ten years. Recently, the 
stalling at the end of the century has 
been followed in 2003–6 by extremely 
high, 10–12 per cent annual growth in 
international trade by value and 7 per 
cent by volume. (The difference is ex-
plained mainly by rises in raw-material 
prices of at least 20 per cent a year in 
that period.) Could this development re-
solve the tough dilemmas of the late 
1990s? 
This decade also has to cope with the 
fact that problems with the international 
trade and payments balances have been 
accumulating in the world economy since 
the 1990s and that these have become 
difficult to handle. As Table 7 shows, the 
US trade deficit had reached $800 billion 
by 2006 (6–7 per cent of GDP), while 
the other large regions without exception 
show surpluses, as mentioned earlier. 
Similar trends are apparent in the inter-
national balance of payments. In other 
words, the whole world is financing the 
United States’ excess consumption, which 
the IMF does not consider sustainable. 
But the approach to equilibrium will be 
a very painful process. The balance is 
being improved by deliberately weakening 
the dollar. The low rate of exchange 
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stimulates US exports and curbs imports. 
An export offensive commenced in 2004 
(8–9 per cent increases per year). 
Meanwhile the import-restricting effect of 
the weak dollar curbs economic advance 
in other regions. This has also contrib-
uted to the continued fragility of world 
economic growth. The other developed 
regions of the world have followed the 
US boom uncertainly, and the United 
States itself moved to a path of slower 
growth in 2007. This may likewise have 
an effect on the expansion of interna-
tional trade, although Asia and Europe 
may prove to be stimuli if the US slow-
down is not too permanent. 
After that general picture, let us look 
more closely at the regional characteris-
tics apparent in the statistics. The five-
year groups show that the role of the 
developed countries in maintaining the 
pace of international trade is declining 
and that of the developing countries in-
creasing. In the 1980s, the exports of 
the developed regions increased faster 
than the global average (by 7.6 per cent 
a year), but more slowly in the 1990s. It 
has to be added that the main factor 
behind the pace of the developing re-
gions (9.1 per cent a year in the 1990s, 
14–15 per cent since 2000) is the big 
corporations of the developed world. The 
trade-geographical sphere is becoming 
virtual as well to some degree and in 
some sense.  
It is directly relevant that Europe’s 
exports and imports stagnated in 1996–
2002, but took off again in 2003 (rises 
of over 13 per cent a year), beating its 
competitors in this respect. The boost is 
explained mainly by the growth of Asian 
trade and the rise in raw-material 
prices. But the data also show the ex-
ports of Central and Eastern Europe be-
gan in 1996 to grow faster than the 
world average and the tendency 
strengthened after the turn of the cen-
tury. As Table 6 shows, Hungary’s ex-
ports have also been increasing (by 18 
per cent a year between 2000 and 
2006).  
China’s exports grew by 18 per cent 
a year in the later 1980s, but only 
about 10 per cent a year after the mid-
1990s, before an astonishing 27 per cent 
in the early 2000s. The South-East Asian 
region (including China) only raised its 
exports by about 5 per cent after the 
mid-1980s, but they began to rise again 
in 2003 (15 per cent). 
The volume of international trade 
doubled in the 1990s (see the Table 8 
time series). Exports by developed coun-
tries rose by 88 per cent between 1990 
and 2000, while those of developing 
countries rose 2.5-fold. Africa’s exports 
increased by a third, but Asia’s tripled 
and Latin America’s rose 2.4-fold. The 
global volume of international trade in-
creased by 29 per cent between 2000 
and 2005. Asia’s dynamism (an average 
increase of 62 per cent for the five 
years) came from China, whose export 
volume tripled in the five years. India’s 
exports rose by 90 per cent. Meanwhile 
the developed countries, Africa, Latin 
America and the oil-exporting countries 
of Western Asia managed only modest 
increases of 19–20 per cent. 
Remarkable changes occurred in the 
terms of trade in the 1990s and still 
more the 2000s. A trend unfavourable 
to the developing countries, which had 
lasted decades and even centuries, came 
to an end; their terms of trade have im-
proved slightly in recent years. This rela-
tively favourable trend since the 1990s 
reflects a change in the division of la-
bour between developed and developing 
countries – geographical but ownership-
based. Inter-regional trade in finished 
products is now two-way. The terms of 
trade are still affected strongly by the 
fluctuating prices for raw materials. The 
latest price tendencies are really favour-
able only to the hydrocarbon and metal-
exporting countries, whose terms of 
trade have improved by 60–70 per cent, 
but this in turn puts a heavier burden 
on oil-importing developing countries. 
Observers attribute the price rises to 
world-market recovery, speculative buy-
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ing, and above all, rising demand from 
China and India. But the trade price 
trends of the 1990s did not alter the 
fact that earlier relative price losses have 
left most developing countries, even to-
day, needing to achieve twice the exports 
by volume to pay for the quantity of 
imports they were making at the begin-
ning of the globalization period, in the 
early 1970s. 
Although the latent inflationary pres-
sure caused by raw-material prices has 
hardly appeared in the regions’ producer 
and consumer prices, it has led to 
higher interest levels. 
The quantitative and exchange-rate 
processes in international trade together 
altered the export structure of main 
country groups and countries (Table 5). 
Export growth was faster in the devel-
oped countries in the 1980s, but in the 
developing countries in the 1990s, so 
that the proportions moved in opposite 
directions. The weight of the developed 
countries rose from 62.6 per cent to 
70.9 in the 1980s, but fell to 65.6 per 
cent in 1990s and 59.1 per cent by 
2006. That of the United States rose 
over a decade and a half by 2.6 per-
centage points to 8.7 per cent; that of 
the EU fell by 3 percentage points to 
40.1 per cent and of Japan by 2.6 per-
centage points to 5.4 per cent. 
Here Central and Eastern Europe ap-
pears separately, with a weight of 8 per 
cent in 1980, 5 in 1990, and 2.6 in 
2000, then for those still outside the EU 
in 2004, to 4.1 per cent in 2006. This is 
mainly attributable to the rise in raw 
material prices. Hungary’s proportion 
according to UNCTAD was 0.4 per cent in 
1980, 0.3 in 1990, 0.4 in 2000 and 0.6 
in 2006. 
So the weight of the developing coun-
tries has increased – from 24.1 per cent 
to 31.7 in the 1990s, to 36.8 per cent in 
2006, i.e. from about a quarter to 
about a third. This is a shift in propor-
tions. Most of the increment was pro-
vided by Asia, whose weight rose from 
16.9 per cent to 28.3. Within this, India 
and the NICs each improved their posi-
tion only by a few tenths of a percent-
age point, as the real driving force was 
China, whose weight in world exports 
rose from 1.8 per cent to 8.1 over the 
15 years. But with reannexed Hong 
Kong, China accounted for 10.2 per cent 
of world exports in 2006, making in it 
the world’s biggest exporter, ahead of 
the United States. 
Latin America has increased its weight 
since 1990 by 1.6 percentage points to 
5.7 per cent. But this can be attributed 
mainly to one country, Mexico, benefit-
ing from NAFTA membership and associ-
ated US manufacturing investment. The 
losing continent has been Africa, whose 
weight of just under 6 per cent in the 
early 1980s fell in the 1990s to just 2.3 
per cent, although higher oil prices 
raised this to 2.8 per cent in 2006. 
Finally, let us look in more detail at 
the trends in the trade balance (Table 
7). In principle, the sizes of global ex-
ports and imports are the same, but the 
accounting methods (c.i.f. and f.o.b.) 
mean that exports are slightly less than 
imports, so that the Earth shows an ag-
gregate deficit of 1.5–2.5 per cent. This 
deficit is not great enough to influence 
the main balance trends in regions and 
countries and in any case it is distrib-
uted in line with weight.  
It emerges from the statistics that sev-
eral regions suffered in the 1990s from 
persistent sizeable trade deficits: the 
United States, North Africa, Latin Amer-
ica, many Central and East European 
countries, and until the turn of the cen-
tury South and East Asia. Their deficits 
were offset by surpluses in Japan, the 
West Asian hydrocarbon exporters, and 
to some extent the European Union and 
China. 
A trade deficit in the economic sense 
means that real value is being drawn in 
as resources. In that sense the net ex-
porters are siphoning off resources from 
the net importers. The significance of this 
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can be measured absolutely, or by com-
paring the deficit with the gross product 
and import bill of the economic unit 
concerned. The latter shows the degree 
to which exports (or export capabilities) 
fall short of imports. 
Based on these measures, the country 
with the gravest trade deficit by far is 
the United States, otherwise the world’s 
mightiest economy. It has been mentioned 
that the US trade deficit has reached 7 
per cent of GDP. Deficits of 1–2 per 
cent of GDP have not been rare in 
world economic history, and equilibrium 
could be swiftly restored by imposing 
import restrictions. The US trade deficit, 
however, is stubborn. It has been accu-
mulating since the end of the 1970s and 
increasing strongly in recent years, from 
$100 billion in the early 1990s to $400 
billion at the millennium and $800 billion 
in 2005. Meanwhile its proportion of 
imports has risen from 22 per cent to 
34 in 2000 and 47 in 2006. The UK, 
Spain, Greece, France and Portugal have 
also had sizeable trade deficits in recent 
years. 
The world’s poorest regions, including 
sub-Saharan Africa, show an export sur-
plus, but again, the average disguises 
the essential feature. For most African 
and Latin American countries and half 
the Asian ones run a trade deficit. Trade 
surpluses are generally found among 
countries in the industrializing middle 
range of the hierarchy of the interna-
tional division of labour, in countries 
with relatively large economies and 
populations, and in hydrocarbon-
exporting countries. 
The North African countries still had 
sizeable export surpluses in the 1970s 
and 1980s but were sent into deficit by 
the effects of globalization and market 
opening in the 1990s, which the present 
high oil prices have failed to offset. The 
situation in Latin America is even worse, 
with trade deficits for the continent and 
for most of its countries and problems 
of indebtedness going back for decades. 
Even the larger, more developed coun-
tries with export surpluses could not re-
duce their accumulated deficits and debt 
stock. The catching-up model of the 
South and East Asian region, including 
South Korea, for instance, based on at-
traction of resources and a trade deficit, 
had to change in the final decade of the 
20th century. The trends differ from 
country to country, but if China is ex-
cluded, Asia still had an overall trade 
deficit until the millennium, when it 
started to become a net exporter again. 
Apart from Russia’s substantial raw 
materials-led export surplus, the coun-
tries of Central and Eastern Europe face 
a significant trade deficit. The extra ex-
ports generated by their export-oriented 
model of economic development have 
been more than offset by the goods im-
ported since the market opening and to 
a lesser extent by the import demands 
of structural transformation. 
 
* * * * * 
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Table 1 
Growth rate of the world’s population (1981–2005) 
and the number and density of population (2001) by country groups and countries  
 
Population Density 
Growth rate 
 
2001 
million 1981–90 1991–2000 2001–5 
2001 
inhabitants/ 
km2 
World 6148a) 1.7 1.4 1.2 45 
Developed market economies 867 0.6 0.6 0.6 27 
USA 288 1.0 1.1 1.0 30 
EU 378 0.3 0.3 0.4 105 
Germany 82 0.1 0.3 0.1 231 
France 60 0.5 0.4 0.6 108 
Great Britain 59 0.2 0.3 0.5 242 
Japan 127 0.6 0.3 0.1 337 
Developing countries 4945 2.1 1.7 1.5 58 
Africa 814 2.9 2.5 2.3 27 
North Africa 177 2.6 1.9 . 21 
Other Africa 637 3.0 2.6 . 29 
Asia 3595 1.9 1.5 1.3 114 
Western Asia 240 3.3 2.2 2.1 39 
Central Asia 73 1.9 0.8 0.8 18 
Other Asia 3281 1.9 1.5 . 156 
China 1263 1.5 1.0 0.7 132 
India 1033 2.1 1.8 1.6 314 
South Korea 47 1.2 0.9 0.8 475 
Indonesia 214 2.0 1.5 1.3 113 
Vietnam 79 2.2 1.6 1.5 239 
Latin America 352 2.0 1.6 1.3 23 
Brazil 174 2.0 1.4 1.4 20 
Mexico 100 2.1 1.7 0.9 51 
Argentina 37 1.5 1.3 1.0 14 
Central and Eastern Europe 337 0.6 –0.2 –0.2 18 
Russia 144 0.7 –0.2 –0.5 9 
Hungary 10 –0.3 –0.3 –0.3 107 
Note: a) 2006: 6593. 
Sources: UNCTAD Handbook of Statistics 2003, 310–15, and 2006–7, 456–69. 
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Table 2 
Development of GDP and GDP/capita 
(1961–2005, %) 
 
Average growth rate of GDP  Average growth rate of GDP/capita  
 
1961–70 1971–80 1981–90 1991–2000 2001–5 1961–70 1971–80 1981–90 1991–2000 2001–3 
World 5.3 3.6 3.2 2.8 2.8 2.1 1.4 1.5 1.3 1.5 
Developed countries 5.1 3.1 3.2 2.5 2.0 4.0 2.2 2.6 1.9 1.4 
USA 4.4 2.8 3.5 3.5 2.6a) 3.1 1.7 2.5 2.4 1.5a) 
EC/EU 4.6 2.8 2.5 2.2a) 1.6a) 3.8 2.4 2.2 1.7a) 1.1b) 
Japan 10.3 4.3 4.1 1.0 1.4 9.1 3.1 3.5 0.8 1.3c) 
Developing countries 5.9 5.6 3.9 4.9 5.2 3.2 3.1 1.8 3.1 3.7 
Africa 5.5 4.3 2.1 2.4 4.7 2.6 1.4 –0.7 –0.1 2.3 
Asia 6.3 5.9 6.0 6.2 6.3 3.7 3.6 4.0 4.5 5.0 
Western Asia 8.0 5.7 2.0 4.0 4.4 5.0 2.9 –1.3 1.4 2.2 
Central Asia . . . . 8.4 . . . . 7.5 
Other Asia 5.2b) 7.4b) 7.2 . . 2.2b,c) 3.0b,c) 5.3 . . 
China 6.1 5.5 10.3 10.6 9.6 3.5 3.7 8.7 6.9 6.4 
Latin America 5.5 5.8 1.7 3.2 2.4 2.7 3.2 –0.3 1.5 1.1 
Central and Eastern Europe 6.8 5.4 –0.4 –4.5 6.2d) 5.6 4.4 –0.4 –4.2d) 6.5d) 
Notes: a) Europe; b) ASEAN; c) own estimate; d)transition countries except those joining the EU in 2004.  
Sources: Handbook of International Trade and Development Statistics 1981 (Supplement), 436–45, and 1991, 347–443; UNCTAD Handbook of Statistics 2003, 316–24 
and after Table 1; UNCTAD Handbook of Statistics 2006–7, 402–9.  
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Table 3 
Structure of the production and use of GDP (1990–2005) by country groups and countries, % 
 
 
GDP production GDP use 
Industry Final use Products and ser-
vices  Year GDP total Agriculture 
Total 
Manufac- 
Turing 
Services 
State Private 
Gross in-
vest- 
ment Exports Imports 
World 1990 100 6.0 33.5 22.5 60.5 17.3 59.5 23.5 19.6 19.9 
 1995 100 4.4 30.6 20.6 65.0 16.8 60.1 22.6 21.8 21.4 
 2000 100 3.8 29.1 19.3 67.1 16.3 61.3 22.3 25.2 25.1 
 2005 100 3.9 28.3 17.8 67.8 18.1 60.7 21.0 28.3 28.1 
Developed countries 1990 100 2.7 31.8 21.4 65.4 17.9 59.7 22.9 18.2 18.7 
 1995 100 2.2 29.2 19.8 68.6 17.6 60.4 21.4 19.5 18.8 
 2000 100 1.8 26.9 18.2 71.3 17.0 62.1 21.7 21.9 22.6 
 2005 100 1.6 24.9 15.9 73.5 19.6 62.4 19.4 24.0 25.4 
United States 1990 100 1.9 27.5 18.3 70.6 17.0 66.7 17.6 10.0 11.3 
 1995 100 1.5 25.8 17.8 72.6 15.3 67.7 18.1 11.4 12.6 
 2000 100 1.4 23.5 15.9 75.1 14.4 68.9 20.5 11.7 15.4 
 2005 100 1.0 20.5 12.2 78.5 19.0 70.1 16.5 11.0 16.6 
Europea) 1990 100 3.4 32.7 22.6 63.8 20.0 57.4 23.2 26.8 27.3 
 1995 100 2.7 29.6 20.3 67.6 20.2 57.8 20.3 30.0 28.3 
 2000 100 2.2 28.1 19.3 69.6 19.6 58.4 21.3 36.6 35.9 
 2005 100 2.0 27.3 18.2 70.7 20.6 58.0 20.2 37.7 36.5 
Japan 1990 100 2.5 38.4 26.0 59.2 13.4 53.0 32.6 10.6 9.6 
 1995 100 1.9 33.2 22.4 64.9 15.2 55.4 28.0 9.2 7.8 
 2000 100 1.7 31.1 21.3 67.2 16.9 56.4 25.2 11.0 9.6 
 2005 100 1.6 29.6 20.3 68.8 18.0 57.4 23.2 14.3 12.9 
Developing countries 1990 100 14.9 35.9 22.1 49.2 13.9 59.7 25.0 25.0 24.0 
 1995 100 12.8 35.9 22.8 51.3 13.5 59.4 27.5 30.6 31.2 
 2000 100 10.8 36.7 22.9 52.5 13.8 58.6 24.6 36.4 33.6 
 2005 100 10.5 37.8 23.5 51.7 13.3 55.9 26.0 41.1 36.9 
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GDP production GDP use 
Industry Final use Products and ser-
vices  Year GDP total Agriculture 
Total 
Manufac- 
Turing 
Services 
State Private 
Gross in-
vest- 
ment Exports Imports 
Africa 1990 100 18.2 38.1 16.7 43.7 15.4 64.1 19.8 28.0 26.2 
 1995 100 17.8 34.4 15.2 47.8 15.3 68.7 18.4 26.7 30.1 
 2000 100 16.6 37.0 13.0 46.4 14.4 62.2 17.1 33.4 27.1 
 2005 100 16.7 36.8 12.0 46.5 14.3 60.8 19.2 37.9 31.8 
Asia 1990 100 17.9 36.9 23.3 45.2 13.5 57.0 28.2 28.7 28.2 
 1995 100 14.4 38.3 25.4 47.4 12.2 55.7 32.1 38.2 38.2 
 2000 100 11.9 39.0 26.0 49.0 13.2 55.0 27.4 44.2 40.0 
 2005 100 10.7 39.9 26.8 49.4 12.6 52.7 28.9 47.5 42.5 
China 1990 100 26.6 40.9 36.4 32.6 12.3 49.7 35.2 2.8 . 
 1995 100 19.8 47.2 41.0 33.1 11.4 46.1 40.8 21.0 19.3 
 2000 100 14.8 45.9 40.4 39.3 13.1 48.0 36.4 25.9 23.4 
 2005 100 13.1 45.7 40.2 41.3 12.2 43.3 41.9 33.0 30.5 
Latin America 1990 100 8.0 33.2 22.3 58.8 13.9 63.1 21.1 16.6 14.8 
 1995 100 8.0 31.8 20.1 60.2 15.5 63.8 21.5 16.7 17.7 
 2000 100 6.5 31.8 19.2 61.7 14.9 64.8 21.2 21.6 22.5 
 2005 100 7.3 32.4 19.0 60.3 14.7 62.5 21.0 25.9 24.1 
Transition countriesb) 1990 100 19.1 45.1 34.6 35.7 19.8 53.6 28.9 24.1 26.7 
 1995 100 11.4 36.8 27.5 51.8 19.3 56.5 24.3 32.3 32.3 
 2000 100 10.5 36.4 27.0 53.1 16.2 54.0 19.4 44.7 34.3 
 2005 100 8.1 36.7 18.7 55.3 17.0 53.1 22.3 38.8 32.2 
Notes: a) Including those acceding to the EU in 2004; b) South-Eastern Europe and the CIS. 
Source: UNCTAD Handbook of Statistics 2006–7, 412–29. 
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Table 4 
Main factors of economic growth in the developed regions, 1990–2006 
(% of annual growth) 
 
  1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 Av. ann. g. 1990–2003 2004 2005 2006 
USA GDP 1.2 –0.9 2.7 2.3 3.5 2.7 3.6 4.4 4.3 4.1 3.8 0.3 2.4 2.6 2.64 3.9 3.2 3.3 
 Private consumption 1.7 –0.6 2.8 2.9 3.3 3.0 3.2 3.6 4.8 4.9 4.3 2.5 3.1 2.9 3.03 3.9 3.5 3.2 
 Public consumption 2.3 1.0 –0.1 –0.3 0.4 0.0 0.5 1.8 1.4 2.9 2.8 3.7 4.4 3.7 1.75 2.1 0.9 1.6 
 Gross accumulation –1.4 –6.6 5.2 5.1 6.6 5.4 8.4 8.8 10.2 7.9 5.5 –2.7 –1.8 2.1 3.76 6.1 6.4 3.1 
 Productivitya) 2.3 2.1 5.2 2.1 3.2 2.1 1.4 1.9 5.4 4.0 7.4 2.5 5.0 4.5 3.51 1.8 4.8 4.0 
 M2 4.1 3.1 1.8 1.3 0.6 3.9 4.6 5.6 8.5 6.3 6.1 10.2 6.8 3.3 4.88 5.8 4.0 5.3 
 Exports 8.5 6.3 6.6 2.9 8.2 10.3 8.2 12.3 2.1 3.4 9.7 –5.4 –1.6 0.3 5.13 9.2 6.8 8.9 
EUb) GDP 3.0 1.6 1.0 –0.5 2.9 2.5 1.7 2.6 3.0 2.8 3.6 1.7 1.1 0.8 1.99 2.0 1.4 2.6 
 Private consumption 3.0 2.3 1.6 –0.2 1.7 1.9 2.0 2.2 3.3 3.7 3.2 2.1 1.1 1.3 2.09 1.5 1.5 1.9 
 Public consumption 2.4 2.2 2.2 0.9 1.1 0.9 1.5 1.0 1.6 2.1 2.1 2.4 2.9 1.9 1.80 1.4 1.4 2.1 
 Gross accumulation 3.8 –0.2 –1.0 –6.3 2.4 3.5 2.3 3.5 6.9 5.2 4.9 0.4 –2.1 –0.2 1.65 2.2 2.5 4.5 
 Productivitya) 1.9 1.4 4.4 3.0 7.5 3.2 1.3 3.6 2.6 2.1 4.8 1.1 1.4 2.1 2.89 3.5 2.9 4.0 
 M2b) 11.6 9.8 4.6 5.9 2.2 5.5 4.0 4.7 4.8 5.3 4.2 11.1 6.7 6.5 6.19 6.6 7.3 9.8 
 Exports 6.5 5.0 3.4 1.4 9.2 8.1 4.9 10.3 6.4 5.4 12.1 2.8 1.2 0.2 5.49 6.7 4.1 8.2 
Japan GDP 5.1 3.8 1.0 0.3 0.6 1.8 3.5 1.9 –1.1 0.2 2.8 0.4 0.2 2.0 1.61 2.7 1.9 2.2 
 Private consumption 4.4 2.5 2.1 1.2 1.9 1.8 2.3 1.1 –0.1 0.2 0.9 1.7 1.4 1.1 1.61 1.6 1.6 0.9 
 Public consumption 1.5 2.0 2.0 2.4 2.4 4.2 2.9 1.0 2.1 4.4 4.7 2.5 2.3 0.5 2.49 1.9 1.7 0.3 
 Gross accumulation 8.5 3.3 –1.5 –2.0 –0.8 0.5 6.9 0.7 –4.1 –0.7 2.7 –1.2 –4.7 1.6 0.66 1.4 2.4 3.5 
 Productivitya) 2.8 1.5 –3.7 –0.7 3.4 4.4 3.8 4.7 –4.0 2.9 6.4 –3.5 3.3 4.3 1.83 5.3 1.6 3.0 
 M2 7.4 2.3 –0.2 2.2 2.8 3.2 3.0 3.9 4.0 2.7 1.9 3.3 1.8 1.6 2.95 1.8 2.0 0.9 
 Exports 6.9 5.2 4.9 1.3 3.4 4.1 6.4 11.3 –2.2 1.4 12.4 –6.0 8.1 7.7 4.73 14.0 6.9 9.6 
NICs (4) GDP 7.3 7.9 5.8 6.3 7.6 7.5 6.3 5.8 –2.4 8.0 8.4 0.8 4.8 2.3 5.46 5.8 4.7 5.3 
 Private consumption 8.9 8.5 7.5 7.0 7.7 6.9 6.3 5.2 –4.7 7.9 7.2 3.1 4.0 –0.7 5.34 2.2 3.3 3.4 
 Public consumption 8.8 8.0 7.4 2.0 2.5 2.6 8.0 3.3 1.8 –0.5 1.8 1.7 1.9 4.3 3.82 1.8 2.9 3.7 
 Gross accumulation 16.7 11.1 6.0 6.4 10.3 10.3 7.3 4.4 –9.0 0.0 10.3 –7.1 .0.7 2.2 4.97 7.5 2.1 3.4 
 Productivitya) 8.3 8.5 8.0 6.5 7.6 7.8 6.9 5.9 –0.4 14.0 9.6 0.3 3.5 2.0 6.32 7.7 5.1 6.0 
 M2 14.9 20.3 16.1 15.5 17.0 13.0 12.6 11.5 19.7 16.9 14.0 7.0 5.4 . 14.15 3.5 4.5 6.3 
 Exports 6.3 12.6 11.6 11.9 12.8 15.7 8.0 10.8 1.4 9.9 16.9 –3.5 10.0 6.0 9.31 17.6 9.4 11.0 
Notes: a) Processing industry; b) Euro zone in 2004–6 and in the case of M2.  
Sources: World Economic Outlook, October 1998, 172–3 and 184; September 2003, 174–5, 186, 194 and 196; September 2004, 200–2, 212, 218, 230; April 2007, 
210–14, 224, 234 and 242. 
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Table 4a 
Flexibility correlation of economic growth and its factors 
(1990–2003) 
 
 United States European Union Japan NICs (4) 
GDP 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Private consumption 1.148 1.050 1.000 0.978 
Public consumption 0.663 0.905 1.547 0.700 
Gross accumulation 1.424 0.829 0.410 0.910 
Productivity 1.330 1.452 1.137 1.158 
M2 1.848 (0.712)a) 3.111 (1.503)a) 1.832 (1.087)a) 2.592 (1.364)a) 
Export 1.943 2.759 2.938 1.705 
Note: a) Corrected for inflation. 
Source: Own calculation based on Table 4. 
 
 
Table 5 
Value and distribution of product exports by main country groups and countries 
(1980, 1990, 2000 and 2006) 
 
Export value at current price 
(USD billion) 
Export distribution 
(%) 
 
1980 1990 2000 2006 1980 1990 2000 2006 
World 2031 3500 6444 12203 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Developed countries 1271 2480 4230 7914 62.6 70.9 65.6 59.1 
USA 226 394 782 1920 11.1 11.3 12.1 8.7
EU 765 1509 2583 4805 37.7 43.1 40.1 40.1 
Japan 130 288 479 645 6.4 8.2 7.4 5.4
Developing countries 598 844 2044 3915 29.4 24.1 31.7 36.8
Africa 119 106 147 333 5.9 3.0 2.3 2.8
Northern Africa 44 37 54 125 2.2 1.1 0.8 1.0
Other Africa 75 70 93 208 3.7 2.0 1.5 1.8
Asia 364 590 1532 3389 17.9 16.9 23.8 28.3
Western Asia 203 138 235 560 10.0 3.9 3.7 4.7
Central Asia . . . . . . . . 
Other Asia 162 452 . . 8.0 12.9 . . 
India 9 18 42 121 0.4 0.5 0.7 1.0
China 18 62 250 969b) 0.9 1.8 3.9 8.1b)
South Korea 18 65 172 326 0.9 1.9 2.7 2.7
Taiwan 20 67 148 224 1.0 1.9 2.3 1.9
Latin America 112 145 361 680 5.5 4.1 5.6 5.7
Argentina 8 12 26 46 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.4
Brasilia 20 31 55 137 1.0 0.9 0.9 1.1 
Mexico 18 41 166 250 0.9 1.2 2.6 2.1 
Central and Eastern Europe 162 176 170 374c) 8.0 5.0 2.6 4.1c)
Russia . . 106 302 . . 1.6 2.5
Hungary 9 10 28 73 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.6
Notes: a) Euro zone in 2006; b) $1292 billion in 2006 together with Hong Kong, which accounts for 10.8% 
of world exports; c) South Eastern Europe and the CIS countries. 
Sources: Partly own calculations after UNCTAD Handbook of Statistics 2003, 2–15; UNCTAD Handbook of 
Statistics 2004, 2–16; UNCTAD Handbook of Statistics 2006–7, 2–16. 
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Table 6 
Growth rate of export value by country groups and certain countries 
(1980–2006) 
 
 1981–5 1986–90 1981–90 1991–5 1996–2000 
1991–
2000 2001–5 2006 
World –0.7 12.4 6.0 7.6 3.7 6.7 11.3 14.8 
Developed countries 0.1 13.8 7.6 6.6 2.7 5.7 9.4 12.6 
USA –1.1 14.0 5.7 7.7 5.2 7.3 3.3 14.3 
EU –1.3 15.1 8.0 5.8 1.9 5.4 11.8 12.8 
Japan 5.7 10.0 8.9 8.7 1.1 4.1 6.5 8.3 
Developing countries –3.7 12.5 3.1 11.0 5.7 9.1 14.1 17.6 
Africa –6.8 5.6 –1.7 0.3 2.2 3.1 16.3 11.7 
North Africa –5.7 2.8 –3.9 –1.6 3.1 2.5 16.6 11.6 
Other Africa –7.5 7.3 –0.5 1.3 1.8 3.4 . . 
Asia –3.9 15.5 4.7 12.9 5.6 9.7 14.9 17.7 
Western Asia –14.5 8.4 –6.0 2.3 8.6 6.1 17.3 12.6 
Central Asia . . . . 4.2 . . . 
Other Asia 5.2 18.2 11.1 15.0 5.1 10.3 . . 
China 7.6 18.3 12.8 18.7 10.0 14.5 26.7 27.2 
South Korea 11.5 18.1 15.0 12.8 5.5 10.1 12.9 14.7 
Latin America –0.5 7.6 1.7 9.2 8.1 10.3 9.7 20.0 
Brasilia 5.1 7.6 5.1 8.9 2.4 5.9 17.1 16.2 
Mexico 8.1 11.0 5.9 13.8 14.7 16.1 5.3 17.0 
Argentina –0.3 9.9 2.1 10.6 3.2 10.1 9.1 15.1 
Central and Eastern Europe 2.5 0.5 2.2 5.0 4.4 8.2 19.9a) 22.8a) 
Russia . . . . 2.0 . 19.2 24.0 
Hungary –0.4 2.9 1.6 3.5 17.1 12.5 18.5 17.1 
Note: a) South Eastern Europe and the CIS countries. 
Sources: UNCTAD Handbook of Statistics 2003, 2–15; 2004, online Tables 1.2; 2006–7, 26–32. 
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Table 7 
Development and ratio of trade balances to imports in main country groups and countriesa)  
(1970–2006) 
 
Trade balance (USD billion) Ratio of imports (%)  
1970–71 1980–81 1990–91 1995–96 2000–01 2005–06 1970–71 1980–81 1990–91 1995–96 2000–01 2005–06 
World –12 –32 –114 –54 –103 –257 –3.7 –1.6 –3.3 –1.1 –1.6 –2.4 
Developed countries –11 –109 –112 18 –236 –707 –4.8 –8.3 –4.5 0.5 –5.6 –10.0 
USA –2 –34 –113 –185 –387 –805 –4.1 –13.7 –22.4 –24.4 –34.2 –46.6 
EU –9 –66 –58 88 27 4 –6.4 –8.3 –3.8 4.6 1.2 0.1 
Japan 2 –3 65 97 88 86 10.2 –2.8 28.5 31.2 25.8 16.6 
Developing countries –1 80 5 –61 130 366 –1.6 18.0 0.7 –4.2 7.3 10.8 
Africa 1 12 –2 –7 –2 42 9.3 16.1 –1.8 –6.3 –1.4 17.2 
North Africa 1 7 –8 –9 –8 22 32.7 22.3 –17.1 –20.1 –16.3 27.8 
Other Africa 0 5 6 1 6 20 0.9 13.1 10.5 2.0 7.7 . 
Asia 0 81 2 –25 157 276 –0.4 31.8 0.4 –2.3 12.4 10.6 
Western Asia 4 95 15 20 70 120 55.4 105.7 14.3 14.5 40.8 33.3 
Central Asia . . . 1 3 . . . . 10.0 23.6 . 
Other Asia –4 –14 –1,4 –46 84 . –18.8 –8.0 –2.9 –4.8 7.9 . 
 China 0 –1 3 11 25 103 20.0 –7.4 6.0 8.7 12.5 15.5 
 South Korea –1 –5 –5 –11 15 23 –59.7 –22.0 –5.8 –8.5 11.3 8.7 
Latin America –2 –11 7 –28 –24 50 –9.8 –9.3 5.8 –11.5 –6.9 9.7 
      Brazil –0 –4 11 –3 –2 39 –7.8 –15.2 50.1 –2.9 –2.8 49.6 
Transition countries –0 –3 –7 –10 3 84b) –0.4 –1.9 –3.5 –4.4 1.0 26.5b) 
      Russia . . . 18 49 123 . . . 35.0 106.2 102.3 
      Hungary –0 –1 0 –2 –3 –2c) –5.9 –6.5 5.2 –15.3 –11.0 –5.5c) 
Notes: a) Two-year averages at current prices; b) South Eastern Europe and the CIS; c) already EU members in 2003. 
Sources: UNCTAD Handbook of Statistics 2003, 6–33; 2004, online Table 1.3 and own calculation based on Table 1.1; 2006–7, 38–46. 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 8 
Time series of export volumes, 1980–2005, by country groups 
(2000 = 100) 
 
 1980 1990 1995 2000 2005 
World 31 48 67 100 129 
Developed countries 34 52 69 100 119 
Developing countries 24 40 63 100 149 
Africa 65 69 79 100 120 
Asia 21 37 63 100 162 
China 7 26 57 100 302 
India 21 35 67 100 190 
Western Asia 76 53 70 100 119 
Latin America 24 42 60 100 119 
Argentina 36 63 73 100 135 
Brasilia 32 58 72 100 162 
Mexico 6 26 49 100 113 
Transition countries . . . 100 143a) 
Note: a) Transition countries except those joining the EU in 2004. 
Source: UNCTAD Handbook of Statistics 2006–7, 206–10. 
 
